Twenty years under watch: will Oakland police finally exit federal oversight this year?

A court hearing is scheduled for July. The federal monitor has used ambiguous evaluation criteria and has not issued a mandatory quarterly report, leaving the outcome uncertain.

This July, US District Judge William Orrick will once again review whether the Oakland Police Department (OPD) can exit the federal oversight imposed by the 2003 Negotiated Settlement Agreement (NSA), which was created after the Riders misconduct scandal. Despite over 20 years of mandated reforms—ranging from internal investigations to officer discipline—the department remains under federal monitoring, primarily due to unresolved issues in two areas: the quality and consistency of internal affairs investigations (Tasks 5 and 45).

In response to the findings of a 2024 misconduct investigation by Oakland’s Community Police Review Agency (CPRA), the Internal Affairs Bureau was recently ordered by the judge to report directly to the Chief of Police. This is an unusual structure for a large city police force—one that adds to an already-high effort committed to internal investigations. With rising administrative costs, officer burnout, and external political pressure to scale back federal involvement in local law enforcement, the City of Oakland is eager to prove "substantial compliance" and end the NSA.

But the federal monitor, Robert Warshaw, has not issued a report in 2025, despite a contractual requirement to do so quarterly. He has not made a site visit to Oakland since 2019, and his previous reports have withheld compliance findings without clear benchmarks for success, creating uncertainty over what OPD must do to satisfy oversight requirements. This lack of clear guidance from the monitor and ongoing internal challenges make the outcome of July’s hearing uncertain.

Despite the NSA guidance on substantial compliance, just two out of thousands of misconduct investigations in three years have stalled the entire oversight process, forcing the department to undergo major internal changes while straining its limited resources.

The history and costs of the NSA

The Negotiated Settlement Agreement (NSA) originated in 2003 following a civil settlement related to the Riders police misconduct scandal. Under this agreement between 119 plaintiffs represented by civil rights attorneys James Chanin and John Burris, and the City of Oakland, the Oakland Police Department (OPD) was required to implement a series of reforms to “promote police integrity and prevent conduct that deprives persons of the rights, privileges, and immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” These reforms include enhancements to supervision, training, and accountability.

The NSA is an agreement between the city and a private party. It is not an agreement with the federal or state government—as such, neither has the authority to withdraw or terminate the agreement. That duty falls to the federal district court which initially approved the settlement, and then appointed a monitor to ensure its implementation. Only the court also has the authority to decide when the agreement is satisfied.

The Negotiated Settlement Agreement (NSA) comprises 51 tasks (see Appendix). As previously reported, compliance with the NSA has placed a significant administrative burden on officers, resulting in more than ten times the number of internal affairs investigations compared to similar jurisdictions. The financial cost to Oakland taxpayers has also been substantial, covering the federal monitor’s salary as well as officer time and overtime dedicated to compliance efforts. Since 2003, the City has spent over $20 million on monitor and court-related expenses, along with more than $3 million in attorney fees. Robert Warshaw and Associates, contracted as the federal monitor, initially received nearly $1 million annually—a figure that has dropped to approximately $400,000 since 2023. In parallel, the City’s civilian oversight bodies (the Police Commission, Community Police Review Agency (CPRA), and Office of Inspector General) operate alongside the NSA with a combined annual budget of $10 million, which is expected to be funded through a proposed parcel tax.

“Leadership failure” leads to continued oversight and structural reorganization

In 2022, Judge Orrick placed the Oakland Police Department (OPD) under a one-year “sustainability period” after it had complied with all but one requirement under federal oversight: Task 45, which pertains to consistency in disciplinary actions. However, the sustainability period was extended due to deficiencies in two misconduct investigations involving the same officer. These deficiencies were detailed in an external report commissioned by the federal monitor, which concluded there was a “systemic failure” within OPD’s Internal Affairs process and a “failure of leadership.” These findings ultimately led to the termination of then–Police Chief LeRonne Armstrong.

A year later, the findings were revisited in an administrative appeal conducted by a retired judge, who carried out an independent investigation. The appeal report concluded that the earlier monitor-commissioned report was based on those “investigators’ own views of the nature of the problem,” and had “overstate[d] the significance of the deficits found in the cases.” It found no evidence supporting the monitor’s conclusion of “multiple failures at every level.” The appeal also noted that the monitoring team reviews approximately 1,000 Internal Affairs cases annually, yet these two were singled out as the basis for concluding there existed systemic accountability failures extending oversight.

At a subsequent case management conference in September 2024, the CPRA's misconduct investigation further delayed OPD’s compliance with the Negotiated Settlement Agreement (NSA). This investigation—conducted by the CPRA and another external investigator—examined a 2022 Internal Affairs case involving allegations of bribery and perjury. The investigation resulted in sustained findings and disciplinary action against several senior OPD members. The monitor’s last report stated these findings “call into question the integrity and capacity of the Department’s internal investigatory process.”

However, OPD’s internal investigations process has undergone significant improvement since 2023, which were not addressed in the monitor’s subsequent reports. Reforms include major revisions to policies and procedures related to Internal Affairs, criminal investigations of department members, and training programs.

Due to what he termed “leadership failure,” Judge Orrick ordered the Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB) to report directly to Police Chief Floyd Mitchell—a structure more typical in smaller jurisdictions. During the conference, Chief Mitchell explained that in his previous role in Kansas City, Missouri, Internal Affairs did not report directly to the chief because of the department's size and scope of responsibilities.

As a result of the judge’s order, Chief Mitchell now holds weekly two-hour meetings with IAB leadership to review more than 500 pending cases. The chief was also required by the judge to read each one of these cases, rather than relying on the summaries of his staff. He remarked at a Police Commission meeting, that he spends half a day each week preparing for these meetings. The court further mandated biweekly meetings with the Mayor (or a representative), the City Administrator, the City Attorney’s Office, the Police Chief, and a member of the monitoring team to review significant ongoing investigations.

The federal monitor withholds compliance

Robert Warshaw serves as the federal monitor and compliance director. Per the court agreement, his team is expected to conduct monthly site visits and issue quarterly reports. However, Warshaw has not personally attended a meeting in Oakland since 2019, according to a senior OPD official with knowledge of the situation. A public records request from 2023 also provides documentation for the last site visit by the monitor’s staff, which was in 2020, and which did not include Warshaw. The most recent report monitor report, issued in December 2024, is now over five months old. This report detailed progress in three remaining tasks: Tasks, 2, 5 and 45.

Task 2 concerns the timeliness of internal affairs investigations, requiring at least 85% of cases to be resolved within 180 days. Warshaw found the department in compliance with this requirement in his December report. Notably, the 180-day deadline is more stringent than California’s one-year limit. Recently, Chief Mitchell has requested an extension of this deadline, citing staffing shortages due to the city’s reduction of more than 100 OPD positions and a hiring freeze. Task 2 calls for increased staffing of Internal Affairs to maintain timely investigations—something the department currently cannot meet. The monitor has warned the department before about the importance of meeting this deadline, citing “Timeliness is an imperative.” The Los Angeles Police Department faced similar challenges and its federal monitor restructured its complaint investigation process to reduce the heavy workload caused by unreasonable case investigation requirements.

Tasks 5 and 45, however, remain out of compliance according to the last report. Task 5 addresses the quality of investigations and complaint procedures. Although Warshaw agreed with the department’s findings in each case he reviewed—and acknowledged that all subtasks were in compliance—he withheld an overall compliance finding. He cited unresolved issues in “leadership, structure, and personnel management” within the IAB but did not specify what changes are required.

Task 45 states that “discipline is imposed in a fair and consistent manner.” OPD has submitted multiple reports tracking disciplinary outcomes by gender and race, showing no disparities. Yet Warshaw again declined to declare compliance, stating that it “would be inappropriate at this time,” without offering any explanation or clear criteria for what would constitute compliance. This lack of transparency has been a recurring issue in his reports; and is a prime example of nebulous requirements for compliance which propagate oversight indefinitely.

Is there an end in sight?

The next Case Management Conference, originally scheduled for January, was first delayed to May, and is now delayed further until July. By then, it will have been over ten months since the new IAB reporting structure was implemented. Warshaw has not submitted a report in 2025, in violation of his contractual obligations. Judge Orrick has expressed a desire to end federal oversight and has indicated hope that recent changes in IAB structure will help achieve that goal.

Ultimately, Judge Orrick holds the authority to end federal oversight, guided by Warshaw’s input. According to NSA Task 52, Section XV.B.3:

“The City has the burden to establish substantial compliance with the Agreement… Non-compliance with technicalities or, otherwise, minor failures to comply while generally complying with the Agreement, shall not be deemed failure to substantially comply with the Agreement.”

Despite the NSA guidance on substantial compliance, just two out of thousands of misconduct investigations in three years have stalled the entire oversight process, forcing the department to undergo major internal changes while straining its limited resources.

A recent Executive Order from the US President directs the “Attorney General [to] review all ongoing Federal consent decrees, out-of-court agreements, and post-judgment orders to which a State or local law enforcement agency is a party and modify, rescind, or move to conclude such measures that unduly impede the performance of law enforcement functions.” The NSA is not a federal consent decree, and its fate is not under the purview of the Attorney General or Department of Justice. A federal consent decree is entered as a court order, whereas a settlement agreement is an out-of-court agreement approved by and enforced by a judge. It is unclear whether the Executive Order will have any impact on the NSA, given the lack of federal jurisdiction on out-of-court agreements.

So the central question remains: Will Oakland ever emerge from federal oversight? Since the NSA began more than 20 years ago—making it the longest-standing federal oversight of a police department in U.S. history—OPD has undergone sweeping changes. But with the monitor’s vague standards and delayed reporting, it’s uncertain whether full compliance can ever be achieved.

The City may petition to end the NSA by demonstrating substantial compliance, but has never sought to do so. Until it does, all eyes turn to July, awaiting a long-overdue report and a decision that could shape the future of policing in Oakland.

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The next Case Management Conference about the NSA with senior district judge William Orrick is scheduled for July 10, 3:30pm at the San Francisco Courthouse, 450 Golden Gate Ave, San Francisco.

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Tags: Public Safety, Crime, Police, Policing, NSA, Federal Oversight

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Appendix

Negotiated Settlement Agreement tasks

Tasks 1-17: Internal Affairs Division (IAD)

Tasks 18-23 - Supervisory Span of Control & Unity of Command

Tasks 24-32 - Police and Procedures for use of Force notification and Reporting

Tasks 33-39 - Reporting Procedures

Tasks 4-41 - Personnel Information Management System (PIMS)

Task 42 - Field Training Officer Program

Task 43 - Academy and In-Service Training

Task 44-46 - Personnel Practices

Task 48 - Departmental Management and Annual Management Report

Task 49 - Independent Monitoring

Task 50-51 - Compliance Unit

Task 52 - Housekeeping Provisions