Policing the police: Oakland's push to remove Internal Affairs from the police department
Oakland considers civilianizing misconduct investigations
In 2016, voters approved Measure LL, establishing civilian oversight of the police through the Police Commission and the Community Police Review Agency (CPRA). Recently, the idea of transferring all police misconduct investigations from Oakland Police Department Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB) to the CPRA has gained traction among some in the city. Its proponents argued it is a cost-saving measure in the city’s 2025-2027 budget discussions.
However, this proposal—born from the broader 2020 city council initiative to Reimagine Public Safety—faces significant hurdles. It would require changing the federal court-mandated Negotiated Settlement Agreement (NSA), making significant structural improvements in the CPRA’s policies and processes, and would add more than $2 million a year to the city’s expenses, not the creating savings that proponents claim. The Police Commission and the CPRA have also failed to demonstrate the rigor in their operations that is currently expected of Oakland Police Department (OPD) Internal Affairs. Nor is there any evidence that the CPRA has the qualifications, experience, training programs, judicial or ethical code, oversight, appeals processes necessary to establish the para-judicial tribunal system they propose. Finally, the commission and the CPRA have no direct accountability to the public, nor consequences for their own potential misconduct, creating opportunities for moral hazard and political manipulation.
Establishing civilian oversight of police misconduct
Measure LL established the CPRA as an investigative agency focused on public complaints related to use of force, in-custody deaths, profiling, untruthfulness, and First Amendment assemblies. The CPRA can receive cases directly from IAB or through its public portals, but it is only required to investigate those within its specific jurisdiction. The Police Commission can also direct the CPRA to investigate additional cases of misconduct. Recent proposed ordinance amendments have attempted to expand the CPRA’s authority to investigate all complaints of misconduct, regardless of source or prior approval.
When the CPRA finds misconduct (a “sustained” finding), the Executive Director proposes discipline to the Police Chief and the Chair of the Police Commission. If the Police Chief disagrees, a Discipline Committee of three Commissioners makes the final decision. There have been concerns that the Commissioners overwhelmingly support the CPRA’s higher disciplinary recommendations.
An effort to “civilianize” the police department
Following 2020’s social unrest, the Reimagining Public Safety Taskforce was formed to explore alternative police responses, with a goal of cutting OPD’s budget allocation by 50%. The Police Personnel Subcommittee recommended that the CPRA investigate all public complaints of misconduct, leaving IAB to investigate “police vehicle collisions and other internally-generated complaints from within OPD.” They cited overlapping work in about 500 cases and argued that even if the CPRA needed more staff, civilian employees would cost less than sworn officers. This would “free up officers within IAB to fulfill their roles of public safety and investigating crimes.”
John Alden, then the CPRA Executive Director, endorsed this idea in a proposal to the Finance Department, calling for the deletion of four sworn positions and converting (“civilianizing”) six more to the CPRA staff. He also recommended ending the Division-Level Investigation (DLI) program, which handled about 1,200 minor cases in 2024. He declared that “Now is the time for bold budgeting to match the bold demands of the public for greater police oversight.”
In 2023, the City Council allocated $100,000 to hire an independent consultant to analyze the feasibility and timeline for transitioning IAB’s responsibilities to CPRA. Outgoing CPRA Executive Director Mac Muir, in his farewell address to the Police Commission last February, supported the idea, calling it a “really valuable cost saving measure for the city of Oakland… it could increase public trust in the accountability process…and also serve as a national model.” He referenced a plan of increasing the CPRA staffing to 32 members.
When asked about the transition plan, Interim Director Antonio Lawson stated “I would prefer that there not be an internal affairs at any police department. I don't think any agency should police itself. I'm an attorney. If you allow attorneys to police attorneys, you're gonna have a problem. So I think it should be the CPRA overseeing those complaints.” This comment disagrees with the fact that attorneys are disciplined by state bar associations, which are themselves composed of attorneys.
A Three-Phase process with increased cost
The report outlines a three-phase process in order to transfer cases of police misconduct exclusively to CPRA. This includes reducing duplication of investigations between the two agencies, expanding CPRA’s capacities to include all misconduct cases, and transferring discipline functions from OPD to CPRA. The report doesn’t match its initial scope due to a reduction in budget for the project. As such, the authors note that this is a truncated report with short-term recommendations.
The IAB and CPRA redundantly investigate about 100 cases every year. Both agencies have different procedures and deadlines. If the CPRA were to be the only agency to investigate these cases, the consultants estimate that it would free up 4 officers for other duties, which is based on a “back of the napkin” estimate by an OPD official. But in order to do so, the CPRA would have to add another supervisory position, at a cost of about $250,000.
If the CPRA were to take over the more than 700 minor division-level investigations per year, it would need to add 10 investigators to CPRA. Division-level investigations are done by field sergeants, who spend about 30 hours per case. The CPRA would need to cover over 21,000 hours of work to complete this work. This would potentially free up sergeant time to resume supervisory and training responsibilities in the field, as currently, 80% of their time is currently spent on administrative duties. However, the additional cost would be over $2 million a year on the CPRA investigators alone, not including the cost of increasing intake, infrastructure and procedural development, administrative overhead, facilities, training, and other staffing needed to establish a new para-judicial tribunal. The cost saving, if any, would potentially be in OPD overtime.
The CPRA will need to meet benchmarks
The report highlights the many hurdles the CPRA would have to overcome before having the capacity to increase its responsibilities. These include high staff turnover, with the CPRA having had five Executive Directors since 2023. The agency also does not have a proper investigative database, formalized onboarding for employees, robust supervision, standardized policies and procedures manual, and standardized closing reports. In addition, the CPRA has had issues meeting the 12 month state deadlines for investigations (known as “3304”).
Legal ramifications
This proposal is dependent on changing the NSA, especially the NSA’s requirement that IAB investigate all misconduct complaints, regardless of severity. Currently, 80% of police misconduct cases are handled at the division level outside of IAB. These minor complaints (Class II misconduct) must still be formally investigated under the NSA and reviewed by IAB.
The NSA was established to enhance accountability and transparency within OPD. Over decades of oversight, the NSA has driven transformative changes within IAB, culminating in the recent restructuring of IAB to report directly to the Chief of Police. Transferring IAB to another agency—without those same stringent rules—would undermine the reforms mandated by the NSA.
The report also noted that the staff changes may trigger collective bargaining issues, and that the City Attorney’s office must be consulted during the transition process.
An alternative to restructuring agencies
As has been previously reported, the investigation of civilian complaints mandated by the NSA has led to a higher number of investigations compared to other jurisdictions. This is due to the NSA requiring formal investigations of minor complaints (Class II), which are predominantly performed by field sergeants.
One of the main goals of transitioning Internal Affairs to a civilian entity was to “free up” time for officers for other non-administrative duties. “ Instead of establishing a para-judicial police tribunal, this objective can be achieved by changing the NSA requirement which mandates that all complaints undergo formal investigation. In that case, many minor complaints can be handled at the supervisor level without full IAB investigation and review. This is similar to what occurred in the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) when their federal monitor changed the department’s complaint policy, which resulted in improved officer arrest rates. Currently, LAPD formally investigates roughly nine times fewer complaints than OPD.
If OPD’s complaint policy were changed to be more in line with national standards, then it would decrease the 700 investigations done at the division level. This would allow OPD field sergeants to be more effective in their training and supervisory duties, leading to improved efficiency and effectiveness of the police force as a whole. There would also be no need to spend over $2 million to grow the CPRA to investigate these cases (and likely more as the full overhead and operational costs are fully accounted).
An uncertain future
The idea to “civilianize” Internal Affairs has been discussed in city government for four years. This was an effort to reduce cost, by transferring police administrative duties to a civilian oversight agency. However, the scope and cost of such an endeavor proves that this is a daunting task, which would require immense restructuring and reshaping of CPRA, who has a history of lack of consistent leadership.
In addition, legal hurdles such as the NSA prevent any changes to our current Internal Affairs policy. This highlights again how current federal oversight of OPD restricts any changes to improve officer efficiency and effectiveness.
This report will be discussed at a meeting of the City Council Public Safety Committee on June 8 at 6pm, in City Hall.
Tags: Police Commission, Police, City Council, NSA
Appendix
Oakland’s talk of “civilianizing” police misconduct investigations highlights the real issue — because my case proves exactly why these investigations need to be taken away from Internal Affairs.
Look at what Gordon Dorham did in my case. At the time, he was a Sergeant working inside Internal Affairs (he is now a Lieutenant in OPD). While in Internal Affairs, Dorham manufactured and “administratively closed” a false complaint in my name — a complaint I never filed. This was a preemptive move to protect Officer John Jacko Romero (of the Cannabis Unit) and his cousin Moses Jacko from accountability for their illegal cannabis operation and their coordinated retaliation against me, including my kidnapping on October 1, 2019.
Moses Jacko lived next door to me, and I reported the stench of his illegal cannabis operation. I have no criminal record, yet I was illegally watchlisted under Watchlist Number: 9596690-00, targeted, and terrorized — all because I exposed this illegal operation being run by the cousin of an Oakland Police Officer.
Dorham deliberately omitted key names and facts so the complaint would be closed without any investigation. Meanwhile, OPD Internal Affairs aggressively pursues minor infractions when convenient but shields insiders and orchestrates cover-ups to protect their own.
My case is exactly why misconduct investigations must be taken away from Internal Affairs. It proves IA can be used to fabricate, bury, and manipulate complaints instead of providing real accountability.
This entire scheme is detailed in Exhibit 25 of my federal civil rights case, Reid v. City of Oakland, et al., Case No. 4:25-cv-00383-JST, filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. You can view it on PACER here: https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/case/56955336/Reid_v_City_Of_Oakland_et_al.
Taking misconduct investigations away from IA isn’t just symbolic — it’s necessary. My case shows exactly why.
🚨 **Accountability Can’t Be Outsourced to Incompetence**
On paper, civilian-led oversight of police misconduct sounds like a reform we should all support. But in practice—especially here in Oakland—it’s failing. Miserably.
The current investigative body lacks the qualifications, training, and integrity needed for such a critical task. What should bring more fairness and transparency is instead delivering confusion, inconsistency, and mistrust.
Yes, some past cases may have been handled with bias. That possibility is very real. But the solution isn’t handing over power to an unqualified civilian entity—it’s removing individual bad actors who violate protocol and holding them accountable *case by case*.
The tragic pattern with Oakland’s administration? Every time they step in, they don’t fix the problem—they make it worse.
Let’s pursue reform that’s thoughtful, precise, and effective. Chaos is not accountability.